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 The infamous statement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Three 
generations of imbeciles are enough,”1 has long been recognized as a 
shameful example of how eugenics has been practiced not only in 
horrendous situations such as Nazi Germany, but even in a country 
founded on the principle that “all Men are created equal.”2 From the 
start, the flawed wording of this principle was evident: “men” was in-
terpreted to exclude women and Negroes. Both groups were excluded 
from voting rights and other civil rights that white men enjoyed for 
many years thereafter. The United States Supreme Court ruling in 
Buck v. Bell denied another group of people the same basic right that 
Holmes and his colleagues enjoyed; apparently they did not think 
that people with mental retardation were “men.”3 
 Paul Lombardo has made it abundantly clear that the decision in 
this case was based on an empirically false claim; the three women to 
whom Holmes referred were not imbeciles at all.4 Still, even if the 
claim were true, the decision would still illustrate eugenics, nega-
tively defined as the effort to prevent the birth of “unfit” individuals.5 
For Holmes, coercive sterilization of a retarded woman was justified 
in order to ensure that her posterity would not be similarly affected.6 
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor Emerita in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Committee on 
Genetics, and MacLean Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Chicago. Cur-
rently Visiting Professor Emerita at Stanford University. 
 1. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Hereafter, I shall refer to this decision ei-
ther as Buck v. Bell or as the Holmes decision. 
 2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 3. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.  
 4. See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. 
Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 52-53, 61 (1985). 
 5. Daniel J. Kevles cites the work of Francis Galton, Karl Pearson, and other eugeni-
cists who “equated fitness with physique and mental ability, and assumed that it was cen-
tered in the middle, and particularly the professional, class.” DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE 
NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 32 (1985). With Gal-
ton’s approval, C.W. Saleeby proposed the distinction between negative and positive eugen-
ics. Id. at 321. Negative eugenics was “intended to encourage the socially disadvantaged to 
breed less—or, better yet, not at all.” Id. at 85. Positive eugenics “aimed to foster more pro-
lific breeding among the socially meritorious.” Id. 
 6. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. 
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As Lombardo reminds us, however, Holmes was not a lone champion 
of this eugenic attitude. American presidents and Nobel laureates 
alike had been publicly associated with the eugenics movement, 
which had many supporters in the public-at-large.7 Apparently, some 
members of the movement distinguished between practices that were 
acceptable and those that were not, cautioning that governmental co-
ercion should not be employed in the laudable pursuit of healthy off-
spring.8 But not until the Nazi atrocities demonstrated to the world 
the horrors to which a eugenic mentality and practice could lead did 
professional and public support for the movement decline and even-
tually grow silent. 
 Advances in genetics and possibilities for manipulating the hu-
man genome have resurfaced concerns about eugenics in our day. 
Typically, these concerns embody the same critique that has been di-
rected against Buck v. Bell and against Hitler’s atrocities; namely, 
that they constitute an egregious disvaluing of human beings whose 
lives and progeny ought to be equally respected. However, one prac-
tice that arose between Holmes’s and our time has generally escaped 
concerns about eugenics, despite the similarity between its rationale 
and that of the Holmes decision. In some quarters this practice has 
become not only acceptable but expected, leading women who decline 
it to feel that they are disappointing others, especially their practi-
tioners. I refer to the practice of prenatal testing and termination of 
affected fetuses. 
 Prenatal testing is mainly performed to identify fetuses with con-
ditions considered undesirable by parents, practitioners, or society in 
general. The great majority of these conditions are incurable, al-
though their symptoms or disabling impact may be reducible through 
treatment and social accommodation. The range of conditions that 
are identifiable in utero has escalated considerably since the human 
genome has been mapped and sequenced. Chromosomal anomalies 
and single gene disorders that affect infants or adults are definitively 
diagnosable through prenatal testing; well-known examples of these 
conditions are Down syndrome, cystic fibrosis, Tay Sachs disease, 
sickle cell anemia, and Huntington disease. Genetic susceptibility to 
complex disorders such as breast cancer and Alzheimer disease is 
also detectable in utero, and propensity for some behavioral traits is 
                                                                                                                    
 7. Paul A. Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three Generations of ??? are 
Enough?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 191, 208-09 (2002). 
 8. Lombardo cites Alexander Graham Bell as an example of those who distinguished 
between eugenic practices that were acceptable and those that were not. Id. at 211-13. Bell 
opposed coercive legal measures and advocated efforts to improve undesirable traits rather 
than eradicate them. Id. at 211. Even if the Buck women had actually been mentally re-
tarded, he therefore would not have agreed with the Holmes decision. See generally id.  
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detectable or likely to be detectable in the near future.9  
 Many fetal disorders are diagnosable through simpler means than 
genetic tests; these include spina bifida and cleft lip and palate, 
which are observable in utero through ultrasound. By far, however, 
the most common condition for which women are referred for prena-
tal testing, and for which they seek termination after a positive diag-
nosis, is Down syndrome, also called “trisomy 21.”10 The rationale 
that underlies testing and termination for this condition is similar to 
the rationale of the decision in Buck v. Bell: to prevent the birth of a 
child with mental retardation. However, in contrast to the Holmes 
decision, which is broadly condemned on legal as well as moral 
grounds, prenatal testing and termination of a fetus with mental re-
tardation is not only legal, but prevalently viewed as moral. Nonethe-
less, both practices illustrate the defining intent of negative eugenics: 
to limit the births of individuals or groups of individuals who are 
deemed unfit or undesirable.11 
 Ironically, in the years between Holmes’s opinion in Buck and to-
day, prenatal testing and termination of “unfit” fetuses have been 
routinely requested and performed without acknowledging the 
eugenic nature of these practices. Genetic counselors, trained to 
guide their clients to make decisions in conformity with their clients’ 
own values, distinguish between their profession’s goals and those of 
                                                                                                                    
 9. Behavioral traits related to genetics include tendencies to alcoholism, obesity, sex-
ual orientation, dyslexia, athleticism, and timidity. MARY BRIODY MAHOWALD, GENES, 
WOMEN, EQUALITY 246 (2000) (documenting these and other examples of behavioral traits 
attributed to genetics). 
 10. “Trisomy” refers to the fact that the affected person has an extra chromosome, i.e., 
three chromosomes instead of two; “21” indicates which chromosome pair is affected. See 
Cathleen M. Harris & Marion S. Verp, Prenatal Testing and Interventions, in GENETICS IN 
THE CLINIC: CLINICAL, ETHICAL, AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIMARY CARE 59, 60 
(Mary B. Mahowald et al. eds., 2001); Cynthia Powell, The Current State of Prenatal Ge-
netic Testing in the United States, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 44, 45 
(Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000). The condition is called “Down” syndrome after 
Sir John Langdon Haydon Down, who first described its symptoms, comparing them with 
those of “Mongols.” See RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS: THE SOCIAL 
IMPACT OF AMNIOCENTESIS IN AMERICA 295-96 (1999). Rapp also cites Down syndrome as 
the most common condition for which women seek prenatal testing. Id. at 223. The actual 
reason for referral in these cases is “advanced maternal age,” which generally means 
thirty-five years or older. Although the risk of having a child with Down syndrome in-
creases with maternal age, most children with Down syndrome are born to younger 
women, who are not routinely referred for prenatal diagnosis as are the older women. 
Younger women are referred for prenatal tests if they have a family history of a hereditary 
disease, if they have already had an affected child, or if screening tests suggest a need for 
definitive testing. See Marion S. Verp, Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disorders, in 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL THERAPY IN PREGNANCY 159, 162-66 (Gloria E. 
Sarto ed., Appleton & Lange 1992); Glenn Schemmer & Anthony Johnson, Genetic Amnio-
centesis and Chorionic Villus Sampling, 20 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY CLINICS N. AM. 
497, 515-16 (1993). 
 11. See KEVLES, supra note 5, at 85 (discussing Saleeby’s distinction between negative 
and positive eugenics). 
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eugenics. Typically, they point to the nondirectiveness of genetic 
counseling and the autonomy of their clients as individuals or cou-
ples; eugenics, as they see it, is a coercive practice directed towards 
whole groups of people.12 As we will see in what follows, the assumed 
differences between prenatal termination for Down syndrome and 
coercive sterilization of the retarded are not establishable with suffi-
cient clarity to support the claim that the latter, but not the former, 
constitutes eugenic practice. Even if both practices are eugenic, how-
ever, that in itself is not adequate grounds for claiming that they are 
legally or morally flawed. 
 As an example of the possible legal and moral acceptability of 
eugenic practice, consider the behavior of most pregnant women who 
intend to bring their pregnancies to term. Most of us who are moth-
ers changed our behaviors considerably during pregnancy, intending 
thereby to improve the chances of having a healthy child. We took 
our vitamins faithfully, quit smoking (if we had ever started), 
avoided aspirin, abstained from ordinary drinks like coffee and Coke 
as well as alcohol, and, in some cases, endured prolonged bed rest or 
hospitalization to avoid premature birth. If positive eugenics is de-
fined as the effort to promote the birth of “fit” individuals, these be-
haviors may well be characterized as eugenic. In contrast to forced 
sterilization of the retarded, however, the efforts of women to do eve-
rything they can to have healthy newborns is widely recognized as 
morally commendable rather than condemnable. Lombardo is right, 
therefore, to suggest that some eugenic practices are not only morally 
appropriate but praiseworthy.13 
 Diane Paul has made it clear that the term “eugenics” can refer to 
very different kinds of behavior.14 Lombardo explores some of these 
meanings and recounts some of the high and low points in the history 
of eugenics, concluding with a challenge to find words to substitute 
for “imbeciles” in Holmes’s infamous statement so that the resultant 
formulation articulates a sentiment that is morally and socially ac-
ceptable.15 He thus suggests the need for line-drawing, by which we 
might distinguish between good and bad eugenics.16 In Part I of this 
Article I attempt to do this by approaching the line from both ends: 
the manifestly bad and the manifestly good expressions of eugenics. 
                                                                                                                    
 12. See generally M.B. Mahowald et al., Genetic Counseling: Clinical and Ethical 
Challenges, 32 ANN. REV. GENETICS 547, 548-50 (1998) (discussing the origin, nature, and 
goals of genetic counseling). 
 13. See generally Lombardo, supra note 7. 
 14. See, for example, her excellent analysis of different meanings of eugenics and 
their implications in Diane B. Paul, Eugenic Anxieties, Social Realities, and Political 
Choices, in ARE GENES US? THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW GENETICS 142, 143-45 
(Carl F. Cranor ed., 1994). 
 15. See generally Lombardo, supra note 7. 
 16. Id. 
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My goal is to get as close as possible to where the line should be de-
finitively placed. Preliminarily, however, I examine the broad array 
of meanings that the term “eugenics” embraces, and identify the 
variables that seem to be associated with these different meanings. 
To the extent that different variables are included in different mean-
ings of eugenics, identifying them helps to clarify what makes some 
(most?) eugenics bad, some eugenics good, and some eugenics proba-
bly neutral. 
 In Part II, I consider the “disabilities critique” that must be rebut-
ted in support of routine prenatal testing and selective termination of 
fetuses with disabilities.17 My analysis suggests a criterion by which 
to determine whether these procedures constitute good or bad eugen-
ics. Finally, I focus on prenatal testing and termination for Down 
syndrome, a condition marked by the same disability attributed to 
members of the Buck family in the Holmes opinion. Although deci-
sions to avoid having children with Down syndrome through prenatal 
testing and termination need not constitute bad eugenics, I argue 
that broad acceptance of the practice does support the disabilities cri-
tique, placing it on the lower end of the spectrum between bad and 
good eugenics. 
I.   EUGENICS AS A SPECTRUM OF CONCEPTS 
 Etymologically, the term eugenics comes from the Greek eugenes, 
which means “well born.”18 In light of this derivation, its meaning is 
as difficult as it has ever been to answer the perennial philosophical 
question, what is “the good”? Still, by its literal definition, eugenics 
does mean something good, not bad: well born, not ill born. Pre-
sumably, this meaning is what led some eugenicists of the past to 
think that the practice they advocated was good, even when others 
recognized it as good in name but not in fact. Francis Galton, who 
coined the term in 1883, probably thought he was doing “good” by 
championing eugenics as the “science of improving the stock.”19 Of 
course, thinking something is good does not make it so.  
 To the extent that eugenics is construed as morally objectionable, 
it is generally associated with coercion. As Paul observes, 
what people object to in eugenics is not the goal, such as improving 
                                                                                                                    
 17. This critique, also called “[t]he disabilit[ies] rights critique” is well-developed by 
Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch in The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing: 
Reflections and Recommendations, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra 
note 10, at 12-13.  
 18. THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 536 (1993).  
 19. RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD, EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH: HOW GENETIC IN-
FORMATION IS PRODUCED AND MANIPULATED BY SCIENTISTS, PHYSICIANS, EMPLOYERS, 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, EDUCATORS, AND LAW ENFORCERS 14 (1993) (quoting FRANCIS 
GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY 24-25 (1883)). 
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the health of the population, but the means employed to achieve it. 
From this standpoint, in the absence of coercion (as reflected in 
law or obvious forms of social pressure), policies designed with the 
good of the population in mind are not properly labeled “eugenic.”20 
Note, however, that coercion is not an element in the etymology of 
the term; neither is it included in scientific and dictionary definitions 
of eugenics as a science by which the human race is improved. Even 
if the concept or term were mentioned, what constitutes “coercion” is 
arguable in its own right. For some, coercion implies the presence of 
formal, legal barriers to choice; to others, practical impediments such 
as economic costs and social pressures function coercively.21 The 
Holmes decision was coercive in the first sense; in an age in which 
reproductive freedom is supported by law, women may nonetheless 
experience coercion in the second sense.22 
 Although I am no more able to define “the good” definitively than 
philosophers throughout history have been, I believe it is possible to 
arrive at an approximate understanding of what constitutes good or 
bad eugenics by approaching the issue indirectly, starting from the 
extreme ends of a spectrum of practices that most people consider 
ethically reprehensible or ethically praiseworthy. Popular approval 
and prevalent practice do not confer moral validity, which is why the 
mere fact that prenatal testing and termination after positive diag-
nosis is widely accepted does not make the practice morally justifi-
able. Nonetheless, the extreme ends of the spectrum are not just 
widely endorsed, but universally upheld by reasonable people. This 
makes the argument for moral validity much more compelling than it 
would be if controversy prevailed regarding their moral or legal 
status. 
 Let us consider, therefore, some examples of activities undertaken 
or omitted in the name of eugenics that seem manifestly wrong, and 
some that seem manifestly right or good. On one side, put the geno-
cide committed by the Nazis or other groups who kill classes of peo-
ple whom they consider undesirable; on the other side, put the health 
promoting behavior of the great majority of pregnant women. Be-
                                                                                                                    
 20. Paul, supra note 14, at 145.  
 21. Paul illustrates this point with regard to the different political perspectives. A 
classical liberal or libertarian, she says, would consider the potential parents of a child 
with Down syndrome “free to abort the fetus or bring it to term,” whereas an egalitarian 
liberal or socialist would claim that the “‘downstream’ costs of caring for a severely handi-
capped child” may limit their freedom to bring an affected pregnancy to term. Id. at 146. 
 22. Feminist philosophers have recently formulated a conception of “relational auton-
omy,” which critiques a narrow or literal conception of freedom on grounds that individuals 
are not adequately definable atomistically; rather, our ongoing relationships to others are 
inseparable from our autonomous decisions. See generally RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF (Catriona 
MacKenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000). “Relational autonomy” also takes into account 
environmental limitations and social pressures on the decisions of individuals. Id. 
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tween these opposite ends of the spectrum are a range of behaviors 
that may be construed as eugenic—sometimes separately, and some-
times in combination;23 they all fulfill in some way the literal mean-
ing of eugenic as well-born. Many decisions about fertility, whether it 
is curtailment through contraception, sterilization, or abortion, or it 
is enhancement through various reproductive technologies, fall 
within the spectrum of eugenics; so do social policies, laws and cul-
tural norms that affect such decisions. Perinatal decisions may also 
be eugenic—if their goal is to promote well-bornness.24  
 Prenatal testing and selective abortion are at neither end of the 
spectrum between good and bad eugenics. By broad social agreement, 
the Buck v. Bell decision belongs closer to the bad end.25 However, 
determination of where a particular behavior belongs on the spec-
trum depends on multiple variables, some of which are identifiable 
through examination of the practices that are clearly locatable at ei-
ther end of the spectrum. The following characteristics distinguish 









Coercive intervention by state or 
government 
 
Autonomous decisions by potential 
parents 
Directed to born persons as a group 
 
Directed to potential children as in-
dividuals 
Terminating their lives 
 
Supporting their lives 
To avoid a specific trait or traits 
 
To promote health or other condi-
tions 
Judged by state to be undesirable Judged by potential parents to be 
desirable 
                                                                                                                    
 23. Prenatal testing, for example, is separable from termination of a fetus, and may in 
fact be associated with the desire to treat rather than eliminate an affected fetus. 
 24. Ironically, once an individual is ill-born, regardless of the degree in which well-
bornness was pursued before birth, the medical options available are largely anti-eugenic 
rather than eugenic. By prolonging the lives of those who are not well-born so that they 
reach reproductive age, medical practitioners facilitate the births of more people who are 
ill-born. If germ line gene therapy is ever successful in humans, this anti-eugenic propen-
sity of health care could be reduced; I doubt, however, that even then it would be overcome. 
 25. As Paul Lombardo observes, “[m]any of the commentaries on Buck describe the 
case as an aberration traceable to the ‘eugenics craze’ of the Progressive Era.” Lombardo, 
supra note 4, at 32. Presumably, an “aberration” of the “craze” would be even more prob-
lematic than the craze itself. 
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Notice that one side opposes and the other respects the autonomy of 
those who are directly affected. Note too that one side involves people 
already born, while the other involves individuals that have not been 
born and may not even have been conceived. One side is eugenic 
practice through termination, not just prevention, of already-born 
individuals who are considered undesirable; on the other side is the 
avoidance of harms and promotion of benefits to intended offspring. 
On one side, the practice is driven by the state or government and di-
rected towards an entire group of people who are defined by a single 
trait or set of traits. On the other side, the practice is driven by indi-
vidual women or couples and directed towards potential children as 
individuals. 
 As Aristotle observed long ago, the good of society generally out-
weighs the good of the individual as such.26 Based on that priority, 
the implicit emphasis on social welfare in the left column is a good, 
but other characteristics in that column are not. In contrast, the 
characteristics on the right are generally understood in a positive 
moral light. Coercion, for example, carries a moral onus that respect 
for autonomy does not—even though both are sometimes justifiable 
and sometimes not. And decisions to terminate lives are obviously 
tougher (and for pacifists, impossible) to justify than decisions to ex-
tend life—because life is a prima facie good.27 Terminating lives is 
even tougher to justify when the individuals to be killed are already 
born, and the sole criteria for termination are single traits or sets of 
traits found in whole groups of people who may also be killed by 
those criteria. In contrast, the lives to be supported on the right are 
seen wholistically, as individual potential children whose worth and 
right to life are not definable solely on grounds of any single trait or 
sets of traits.  
 The Buck v. Bell decision is on the left side of the eugenics spec-
trum because it fulfills all but one of the characteristics listed under 
Nazi genocide. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Buck authorized the 
forced sterilization, but not the killing, of “imbeciles.” Nonetheless, it 
constituted government endorsement of coercive intervention to 
avoid a specific trait deemed socially undesirable by state legislators. 
Worse, the Holmes decision purported to effect its eugenic goal by 
preventing individuals from exercising a right that is central to many 
                                                                                                                    
 26. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1129 (Richard 
McKeon ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1941) (“[T]he state is by nature 
clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the 
part.”).  
 27. It is at least a prima facie good. Beyond that minimal claim, it may be argued that 
life is a necessary condition for all other goods attributed to living entities. 
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people’s lives, i.e., the right to have a child.28 Admittedly, some people 
with disabilities may be incapable of raising a child or, at least, rais-
ing one by themselves. Many are, nonetheless, capable of biological 
and social parenthood. So the Holmes decision is only as much re-
moved from the far left as sterilization is from homicide. Moreover, 
as Lombardo makes clear, the assessment of someone as an “imbe-
cile” or so impaired as to justify sterilization may be questionable 
even on empiric grounds.29  
 Prenatal testing is of course separable from termination of af-
fected fetuses. When it is considered separately, prenatal testing may 
be not only close to but at the right end of the spectrum of eugenics. 
Some women seek testing with no intention of terminating their 
pregnancies if the fetus is found to have an anomaly. They may re-
quest tests solely to identify a condition that is potentially and effec-
tively treatable in utero, to determine a mode of delivery that is 
likely to optimize the outcome for the child, or simply to prepare 
themselves or other family members for the birth of an affected child. 
In such cases, the testing is either eugenically neutral or “good 
eugenics.”  
 When prenatal testing is undertaken to identify anomalies and 
terminate affected fetuses, it belongs closer to the left side of the 
spectrum. Two factors distinguish this from forced sterilization: the 
eugenic decision is made autonomously by the pregnant woman 
rather than by government imposition; and the life of the fetus, 
rather than the capacity for reproduction, is thereby ended. Govern-
mental coercion puts sterilization closer to the far left, but direct kill-
ing of the fetus may be just as bad or worse if the fetus is imputed to 
have moral status. This brings us to the charge leveled by some peo-
ple with disabilities against those who support prenatal testing and 
termination of affected fetuses. To them, these routine practices 
clearly constitute bad eugenics. 
II.   THE DISABILITY RIGHTS CRITIQUE OF PRENATAL TESTING AND 
SELECTIVE ABORTION 
 The link between genetics and advocacy for people with disabili-
ties has precipitated “the disability rights” critique of prenatal test-
ing and selective abortion, and “the expressivist argument” with 
                                                                                                                    
 28. See MARY BRIODY MAHOWALD, WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN HEALTH CARE: AN 
UNEQUAL MAJORITY 93-97 (1993) (discussing the meaning of a “right,” distinctions between 
legal and moral, positive and negative, absolute and relative rights, and differences be-
tween the right to have a child and the right to reproduce). 
 29. Lombardo, supra note 4, at 57-63. 
228  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:219 
 
which the critique is associated.30 According to Erik Parens and Adri-
enne Asch, the critique involves three main claims.31 First, prenatal 
diagnosis undercuts recognition of the extent to which the meaning 
and impact of “disability” are socially constructed; second, it implies 
unwillingness of parents to accept an imperfect child; and third, it 
usually involves inadequate understanding of the disabilities it at-
tempts to avoid.32 
 Prenatal testing probably does undercut recognition that disabili-
ties are largely socially constructed. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
support prenatal testing while reducing the disadvantaging impact of 
its social construction. Positive prenatal diagnosis generally leads to 
termination, but it is the termination rather than the diagnosis that 
is most problematic from a disability rights perspective. In fact, the 
diagnosis may be undertaken to facilitate interventions on behalf of 
the disabled or even to ensure that the intended child is affected with 
a specific disability.33 (I will ignore here the fact that some supposed 
“disabilities” are not viewed by people with those conditions as dis-
abilities.) 
 The second claim, that prenatal testing implies parental unwill-
ingness to accept an imperfect child is not necessarily true; rather, it 
implies the unwillingness of parents to accept a fetus with certain 
disabilities if this can be avoided through testing and termination or 
treatment. What is pivotal here, in part because imperfect newborns 
(and children) whose parents accept and love them are commonplace, 
is that the parents who terminate after positive diagnosis do not con-
sider the fetus a child at all, whether perfect or imperfect. At most 
the fetus is a potential child, and the potential of having a child with 
disabilities is what is avoided. So long as the fetus is not morally 
comparable to a person who is disabled, testing and termination to 
ensure that ill-bornness is prevented may be morally equivalent to 
contraception for better spacing of offspring.  
 The third claim of the disability rights critique is that prenatal 
diagnosis usually involves inadequate understanding of the disabili-
ties it attempts to avoid. This claim is true in most cases despite the 
efforts of genetic counselors to provide their clients with all of the in-
formation relevant to their decisions. It is hardly controversial that 
women or couples deserve to be maximally informed about the dis-
abilities for which they may be tested. However, knowing more about 
                                                                                                                    
 30. For a recent survey of different positions on the morality of abortion and argu-
ments in support of them, see THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION (Susan Dwyer & Joel Feinberg 
eds., 3d ed. 1997). 
 31. Parens & Asch, supra note 17, at 12-13.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Admittedly, requests to ensure disability in children are both legally and morally 
problematic. 
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a condition does not necessarily mean that a decision to terminate is 
less likely. For at least one condition, Down syndrome, the opposite 
seems to be the case. (I will return to this point later.) 
 The “expressivist argument” with which the disability rights cri-
tique is associated is stronger than the preceding claims.34 Simply 
put, the argument is that prenatal testing sends the message to peo-
ple with disabilities that their lives are not worth living. As Asch ob-
serves: “a single trait stands in for the whole, the trait obliterates the 
whole” with “no need to find out about the rest.”35 However, support 
for a woman’s decision to terminate a fetus assumes the priority of 
her choice over the life of the fetus, regardless of whether it is dis-
abled. It should be possible, therefore, to support a right to testing 
and termination without practicing the discrimination towards peo-
ple with disabilities that apparently motivated the Buck decision.  
 Regardless of whether abortion is legal or moral, prenatal testing 
and selective abortion to avoid the birth of children who are disabled 
may exemplify bad eugenics. Although decisions to terminate an af-
fected fetus are assumed to be made autonomously by individuals, 
the rationale for termination is to prevent the birth of a child whose 
trait, identified as undesirable, “stands in for the whole.”36 Occasion-
ally, the rationale for the termination is the best interests of the po-
tential child; in other words, it seems better for a particular fetus not 
to be born because its inevitable “ill-bornness” is so severe. Even with 
very severe anomalies, however, the predominant experience of the 
child is rarely, if ever, one of suffering unless he or she is not given 
adequate care after birth. 
 Provision of “adequate care after birth” is usually much more de-
manding and difficult for parents of children with disabilities than 
for other parents. Few have the resources, whether economic or psy-
chosocial, to meet the challenge alone; yet society often seems to ex-
pect them to do so. A healthy woman who lacks the necessary re-
sources for providing adequate care of a healthy infant may termi-
nate her pregnancy solely on grounds of her inability to care or lack 
of social supports for doing so. While such decisions are morally prob-
lematic for various reasons, they do not constitute bad eugenics. If it 
is not bad eugenics for a woman to choose abortion because of her in-
ability to care for a child who is not disabled, neither is it bad eugen-
ics for her to choose abortion solely because she is unable to care for 
one who is disabled and no one else is willing or able to provide care. 
                                                                                                                    
 34. Parens and Asch cite Allen E. Buchanan for developing the “expressivist argu-
ment” that they elaborate and critique. Parens & Asch, supra note 17, at 13-17 (citing Al-
len E. Buchanan, Choosing Who Will be Disabled: Genetic Intervention and the Morality of 
Inclusion, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 18 (1996)). 
 35. Id. at 13. 
 36. Id.  
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Acknowledgment of one’s inability to care for another is not equiva-
lent to rejection of another because of a condition or trait that ren-
ders the other unworthy of care. Accordingly, a criterion by which we 
may determine whether prenatal testing and termination of an af-
fected fetus illustrates “bad eugenics” on the part of the woman who 
chooses these procedures is that the mere fact of the disability is not 
the pivotal reason for her choice.37 Other reasons may be adequate or 
inadequate in their own right but they do not constitute the bad 
eugenics of discrimination against the disabled, nor do they imply 
that life with disability is not worth living. Other possible reasons for 
testing and termination are the avoidance of health risks to the 
pregnant woman and her responsibilities for other children or adults. 
 If prenatal testing and termination are performed solely to avoid 
the birth of a child with a specific trait, the procedures are closer to 
the left end of the spectrum between bad and good eugenics. Down 
syndrome is a chromosomal anomaly associated with the level of re-
tardation that the Buck court apparently wanted to avoid in future 
generations; it thus seems to illustrate this leftward leaning. Be-
cause Down syndrome is tested for so routinely in the prenatal set-
ting, it merits careful scrutiny as a potentially acceptable substitute 
for “imbeciles” in the Buck case. Few people with Down syndrome are 
classifiable as “imbeciles.” Like the Bucks, they may be educated and 
live satisfying lives despite their mental limitations. When the jus-
tices formulated their ruling in the Holmes decision, they did not 
have the benefit of prenatal tests to determine whether the alleged 
retardation of Emma, Carrie, and Vivian Buck was hereditary; they 
apparently based their judgment on the (inaccurate) observation that 
the retardation had occurred in all three generations.38 Even if the 
Buck court had been correct about the alleged retardation and its he-
reditary character, it could not have definitively predicted its degree 
of impact on future generations. Today we can definitively diagnose 
Down syndrome and some other anomalies in utero; in many cases, 
however, we cannot definitively predict their impact on affected indi-
viduals or on society in general. 
A.   Prenatal Testing and Termination for Down Syndrome 
 Down syndrome, the most frequently identified cause of mental 
retardation, occurs in about one in 770 newborns.39 This incidence is 
lower than it was prior to the advent of prenatal testing and the 
                                                                                                                    
 37. I developed the rationale for this criterion in ANITA SILVERS, DAVID WASSERMAN 
& MARY B. MAHOWALD, DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON 
JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 236-39 (1998). 
 38. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 39. RICKI LEWIS, HUMAN GENETICS: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 212 (2d ed. 1997). 
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availability of selective abortion. However, because the lifespan of af-
fected individuals has improved considerably during the past few 
decades,40 the actual number of people with Down syndrome in the 
general population has been increasing, just as it has with regard to 
other conditions associated with a shortened lifespan.41 Although re-
ferrals for prenatal testing may be based on general screening tests 
or positive family history, most referrals are based on maternal age 
of thirty-five years or more. The latter rationale stems from the fact 
that the risk of chromosomal anomalies increases with age, and 
thirty-five is the approximate age at which the risk of fetal loss or 
damage to the fetus through amniocentesis itself is about equal to 
the risk of having an affected fetus.42 The actual risk of Down syn-
drome in a woman who is thirty-five is one in 385; the risk of her 
having a fetus with other anomalies is one in 434, making her total 
risk of chromosomal anomaly one in 204.43 The fetal loss rate for mid-
trimester amniocentesis is 1%, and for transcervical chorionic villus 
sampling is 0.5%-1% over the general population risk.44 
 In comparison with the symptoms of other prenatally diagnosable 
anomalies, the common symptoms of Down syndrome are well known 
to most people. Most notable is mental retardation, found in all af-
fected persons, but the degree of retardation, ranging from moderate 
to severe, is not predictable prenatally.45 Most people are also famil-
iar with facial features associated with Down syndrome; they are less 
likely to be aware of medical problems that occur more frequently in 
                                                                                                                    
 40. In the United States, for example, the median age at death of people with Down 
syndrome increased from twenty-five years in 1983 to forty-nine years in 1997. Quanhe 
Yang et al., Mortality Associated with Down’s Syndrome in the USA from 1983 to 1997: A 
Population-based Study, LANCET, Mar. 23, 2002, at 1019. 
 41. Cystic fibrosis is another condition for which improvements in treatment have led 
to increased lifespan in affected individuals. Although the fertility rate of women with cys-
tic fibrosis is less than that of their healthy counterparts, many who survive into their re-
productive years have children. In contrast, men with Down syndrome or with cystic fibro-
sis are generally infertile, and very few cases of pregnancy in women with Down syndrome 
have been reported. Regarding fertility in people with cystic fibrosis, see Robert C. Stern, 
Cystic Fibrosis and the Reproductive Systems, in CYSTIC FIBROSIS 381 (Pamela B. Davis 
ed., 1993). Regarding fertility in people with Down syndrome, see PAUL T. ROGERS & MARY 
COLEMAN, MEDICAL CARE IN DOWN SYNDROME: A PREVENTIVE MEDICINE APPROACH 196-
98 (1992). 
 42. Verp, supra note 10, at 161-63. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.; see also Schemmer & Johnson, supra note 10, at 515-16. 
 45. Moreover, the majority of people with mental disabilities are only mildly retarded. 
According to Anita Silvers, citing Justice Thurgood Marshall in City of Cleburne v. Cle-
burne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 461-66 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part), over 90% of people labeled with mental retardation would 
not have been considered disabled in other periods of history, and the capabilities of many 
in this group are more comparable to those of nonretarded people than to the capabilities 
of severely retarded individuals. E-mail from Anita Silvers, Professor of Philosophy, San 
Francisco State University, to author (May 10, 2002) (on file with author). 
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those affected (e.g., about 40% have congenital heart disease).46 Most 
of these medical problems are as treatable as they would be in other 
patients. 
 People with Down syndrome are described as having “warm, lov-
ing personalities and enjoy[ing] art and music.”47 Some parents claim 
they are easier to raise than their unaffected offspring.48 Because 
children with Down syndrome are apparently happy, preventing 
their birth can hardly be justified as a means of preventing suffering. 
A more honest rationale is prevention of the burden of their care to 
their family members or to society. While this rationale may also be 
morally problematic, it is not equivalent to a claim that their lives 
are not worth living. Consistent with the criterion I have suggested, 
so long as the reason for prenatal testing and termination is not the 
disability as such, testing and termination for Down syndrome does 
not belong on the left side of the eugenics spectrum. 
 While individuals are unable to care adequately for a child in 
some instances, the same is hardly true for society as a whole, at 
least in the developed world. Collectively, society has all the re-
sources necessary to care adequately for all of its people: healthy 
newborns, those with disabilities, or anyone who needs care that is 
not available through parents or other family members. Accordingly, 
society in general does not have the justification that some pregnant 
women may have for testing and abortion of fetuses whose subse-
quent care may be impossible for them to provide. So why has prena-
tal testing and termination of affected fetuses, particularly those 
with Down syndrome, become so widely accepted by society? One 
reason is that fetuses do not count as persons under the law of the 
                                                                                                                    
 46. Other potentially life-threatening disorders with a higher-than-normal incidence 
in people with Down syndrome are gastrointestinal disease and leukemia. ROGERS & 
COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 78-81. One of the gastrointestinal disorders more prevalent in 
infants with Down syndrome than in other infants is esophageal atresia. In 1982, parents 
in Bloomington, Indiana refused consent for surgery to correct this life-threatening condi-
tion in their newborn with Down syndrome. Litigation regarding the refusal (which led to 
the infant’s death on the sixth day of life) provoked various efforts of the federal admini-
stration and Congress to mandate life-saving treatment in similar circumstances. For a 
summary of the case and related legislative efforts, see MAHOWALD, supra note 28, at 170-
72, 181-82. 
 47. LEWIS, supra note 39, at 210. That this description is rather stereotypical should 
be acknowledged. Gibson observes that people with Down syndrome are widely imputed to 
have traits that are contradictory; they are alleged, for example, to be “affable, mischie-
vous, docile, aggressive, affectionate, stubborn, pleasing and self-willed.” DAVID GIBSON, 
DOWN’S SYNDROME: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MONGOLISM 111 (1978). Of course, individuals 
with Down syndrome vary considerably in their manifestation of these traits, and stereo-
types are not necessarily applicable to all members of a class.  
 48. See generally P. Gunn & P. Berry, The Temperament of Down’s Syndrome Tod-
dlers and Their Siblings, 26 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 973 (1985); Brian E. 
Vaughn et al., Short-Term Longitudinal Study of Maternal Ratings of Temperament in 
Samples of Children with Down Syndrome and Children Who Are Developing Normally, 98 
AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 607 (1994). 
2003]                         AREN’T WE ALL EUGENICISTS? 233 
 
land.49 Although some fetuses are developmentally older and health-
ier than some premature infants, they do not have rights comparable 
to those of born individuals. As long as a clear line can be drawn at 
birth, decisions to terminate the developing organism prior to that 
time are separable from those made after birth, regardless of 
whether it is well-born or ill-born. 
 Another reason is that society, through its policy makers and 
those who influence public opinion, really does want to reduce the 
number of people who are mentally retarded in the general popula-
tion; it may focus on Down syndrome because its presence is more 
easily recognizable than other conditions associated with mental re-
tardation. In general, it wants to “improve the stock” and perhaps 
avoid the costs of care by eliminating or at least reducing the num-
bers of a particular group of people by encouraging testing in women 
and supporting the abortion of fetuses that test positive for Down 
syndrome. That this rationale has been effective seems clear from the 
fact that most women who are told that their fetus has this anomaly 
choose to terminate their pregnancies more quickly than when they 
are given other fetal diagnoses, some of which have more devastating 
medical consequences.50  
 Broad acceptance of testing and termination for Down syndrome 
is thus triggered by a society that generally supports the termination 
of lives considered undesirable because of a specific trait, namely, 
mental retardation, and possibly because of the appearances that are 
characteristic of people with Down syndrome. Although decisions for 
prenatal testing and termination are usually thought to be autono-
mous, some individuals report that they feel pressured by physicians 
and others to undergo prenatal testing and encouraged to terminate 
when the result is positive.51 To the extent that this is so, prenatal 
testing and termination of affected fetuses cannot be considered 
                                                                                                                    
 49. The legality of abortion assumes that fetuses do not have rights comparable to 
those of born individuals. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). However, dam-
ages and insurance payments are sometimes awarded to pregnant women on grounds that 
their fetuses are harmed or prevented from being born. See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. 
Bellefonte Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 935 (1980). 
 50. According to Rapp, abortion after a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome is “al-
most automatic” because the women whose fetuses are affected are generally familiar with 
symptoms of the condition. RAPP, supra note 10, at 223-25. With other diagnoses, they tend 
to seek more information before making their decisions. Id.  
 51. Unlike genetic counselors, the obstetricians who routinely offer and provide pre-
natal diagnosis to women of “advanced maternal age” are trained to be directive rather 
than nondirective with patients. The goal of these physicians is to ensure that the woman 
and her potential child are both healthy; to many, accomplishing that goal may require 
testing and termination of an affected fetus. Given the usual power discrepancy between 
pregnant patient and physician, and the woman’s dependence on him or her for care, this 
attitude entails at least a subtle form of pressure to do what the physician wishes. 
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“good eugenics.”52 If the decisions are imposed by others, the princi-
pal difference between Nazi eugenics and prenatal testing and ter-
mination for a fetus with Down syndrome is that fetuses are not born 
persons. Obviously, this is an important distinction, but one that still 
places it with the Buck court on the left side of the eugenics spec-
trum. In other words, with regard to routine testing and termination 
for this particular anomaly involving mental retardation, the deci-
sions of individuals or couples are eugenically neutral, so long as 
conditions other than the disability itself form the rationale for the 
decision to terminate. Depending on the other reasons for the testing 
and termination, and assumptions about the moral status of the fe-
tus, these decisions may be ethically justified. 
 Social attitudes and practices regarding prenatal testing for Down 
syndrome are another matter. I believe these illustrate bad eugenics 
for a number of reasons. Principal among these reasons is a deep 
seated ableism on the part of society’s leaders, who, having benefited 
by the abilities they currently enjoy, rarely recognize that these are 
mainly a matter of luck or fortune rather than deserved or earned. 
Even in a culture of political correctness, where attempts to ignore 
differences are manifest, this ableism prevails. Ironically, it is rein-
forced by ignoring differences and therefore doing nothing to correct 
the inequalities associated with them. This ethos of ableism no doubt 
influences individual women and couples to conform to its standard 
by avoiding the birth of a child who is disabled.  
III.   CONCLUSION 
 Recall the expressivist argument with which the disability rights 
critique is associated: prenatal testing sends the message to people 
with disabilities that their lives are not worth living. This argument 
is well-supported, I believe, in the encouragement pregnant women 
typically receive to undergo prenatal testing when they are thirty-
five years or older. Some women report that they are more than en-
couraged; they are expected to undergo prenatal testing because of 
the supposedly high risk of a chromosomal anomaly, especially Down 
syndrome.53 To a lesser degree women are expected and encouraged 
                                                                                                                    
 52. Presumably, this is why the American Medical Association (AMA) warns against 
the “subtle or passive eugenics brought about through a combination of social pressures” to 
employ existing genetic reproductive technologies. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 
American Medical Association, Ethical Issues Related to Prenatal Genetic Testing, 3 
ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 633, 633-35 (1994). The AMA Council acknowledges that these tech-
nologies already provide the basis for decisions about the worth of individual lives, and 
that this “may constitute an extremely dilute but acceptable form of eugenic selection.” Id. 
 53. During pregnancies in my late thirties, I experienced this expectation on the part 
of clinicians. Some authors affirm the importance of having this option. See, e.g., Mary Ann 
Baily, Why I Had Amniocentesis, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 
10, at 64-71; RAPP, supra note 10, at 3-5. However, whether prenatal testing is truly or 
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to terminate the pregnancy if the fetus is affected.54 In other words, 
the single trait of mental retardation and other traits associated with 
Down syndrome stand in for the whole of the potential person, and as 
Asch puts it, there is no need to find out about the rest of the person 
because “the trait obliterates the whole.”55 In the Holmes decision, 
the trait of mental retardation obliterated the right of three people to 
become parents. In prenatal testing and termination for Down syn-
drome, the trait of mental retardation obliterates the person that the 
fetus may become. In this narrow context, then, I propose a substi-
tute for Holmes’s infamous statement, one that I consider not only 
legally supportable but morally demanded: Three generations of peo-
ple with mental retardation are not enough. 
 
                                                                                                                    
fully an option depends on the parties involved, the quality of the relationship between the 
woman and her physician, the adequacy and accuracy of the information provided, and on 
the availability of social and economic supports for continuing or discontinuing an affected 
pregnancy. That younger women may also be influenced by the expectation of clinicians 
that they undergo prenatal screening is clear from a survey of pregnant women in South 
Wales. Layla N. Al-Jader et al., Survey of Attitudes of Pregnant Women Towards Down 
Syndrome Screening, PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS, Jan. 2000, at 20, 23-29. All of the women were 
less than 35 years of age. Id. About half were not well informed about the tests, and the 
majority were unaware that they were voluntary. Id. The few (5 out of 101) who refused 
screening tended to be better educated and of higher social class. Id. 
 54. The anticipated cost of raising a child who is mentally retarded, and lack of social 
supports for doing so, constitute a kind of “passive eugenics,” especially for women or cou-
ples whose financial situations are already in jeopardy. Bowman uses the term “passive 
eugenics” to apply to the denial of appropriate medical care to the poor. James E. Bowman, 
The Road to Eugenics, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 491, 493 (1997). He imputes an in-
evitable connection between active and passive eugenics: “[A] society that countenances 
passive eugenics,” he writes, “provides fertile ground for both clandestine and overt active 
eugenics.” Id. 
 55. Parens & Asch, supra note 17, at 13. 
